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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to verify the hypothesis that a debt write-off 
implemented recently by Polish authorities in favour of public hospitals constitutes 
State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union. The paper contains a detailed description of the nature of the 
measure – its historical background, regulatory context, as well as its construction. 
It presents an in-depth analysis of the fulfilment by the measure of the conditions 
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stipulated in Article 107(1) TFEU. As a preliminary issue, the analysis addresses 
the problem whether Polish public hospitals can be considered as undertakings 
within the meaning of EU competition law, particularly, as to their activity financed 
by the sickness fund organized under the principle of social solidarity. The answer 
to this question seems to be affirmative and in line with the landmark Hoefner and 
Elser judgments where the ECJ held that the way in which an entity is financed 
is irrelevant for its classification as an undertaking. The paper argues in favour of 
the thesis that the debt write-off must be considered as affecting trade between 
Member States and competition. Consequently, and contrary to the official position 
of the Polish government, the measure in question is classified as State aid.
Résumé 
Le but de cet article est de vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’amortissement total 
des dettes effectué récemment par les autorités polonaises en faveur des hôpitaux 
publiques constitue une aide publique au sens de l’Article 107(1) TFUE. L’article 
contient une description détaillée de la nature de cette mesure – son histoire, 
contexte législatif aussi que sa construction. Il présent une analyse profonde de 
l’accomplissement par cette mesure des conditions indiquées par l’Article 107(1) 
TFUE. Comme question préliminaire, l’analyse a pour objectif de vérifier si les 
hôpitaux publiques polonais peuvent être considérés comme entreprises au sens 
de la loi de concurrence de l’EU par rapport à son activité financée par le fonds 
de maladie organisé en accord avec le príncipe de la solidarité sociale.
Classifications and key words: Poland; healthcare services; hospital services; 
state aid; notion of state aid; write-off of the debts of an undertaking; notion of 
undertaking in the EU competition law; public undertakings; social solidarity; 
cross-subsidization; effect on trade between Member States; adverse effect on 
competition; notification of state aid; services of general economic interest.
I. Introductory remarks 
The Polish healthcare system has been experiencing serious difficulties for 
many years. Independent Public Healthcare Facilities (hereafter, IPHF), which 
form the backbone of the Polish hospital services sector, are in a particularly 
difficult financial situation. According to data provided by the Ministry of 
Health, the amount of overdue debt of Polish IPHF’s has reached 2.372.282 
thousand zlotys (approximately 550.000 thousand EUR)1 at the end of the 
first quarter of 2011. This situation results not only in high costs of healthcare 
1 http://www.mz.gov.pl/wwwfiles/ma_struktura/docs/zal_zobowiazania_04072011.pdf
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provision by these entities, but it is also a threat to their provision in the 
future. The bad diagnosis of the situation of Polish hospitals has prompted the 
government to develop a new concept of healthcare reform. The resulting Act 
of 15 April 2011 on healthcare activities (hereafter, Act) came into force on 1 
July 20112. The new legal framework refers to the fundamental causes of the 
difficulties of the Polish healthcare system as identified by the government. 
According to the authors of the Act, these causes include:
1) imperfect, inefficient legal form in which healthcare facilities operate,
2) inadequate qualifications of managers of public healthcare units,
3) limited liability of its establishing entities for the obligations of IPHF3. 
The reform of the Polish healthcare system puts emphasis not on the 
modification of the manner in which healthcare activities are financed but 
instead, on a change in the legal form of those providing healthcare as well 
as on establishing new legal framework for providing healthcare activity. 
The basic principle of the reform is to change the current status quo in 
which IPHFs constitute the dominant legal form for conducting healthcare 
activities, particularly so in hospital services. The crucial expected result of 
the reform is to replace IPHFs by commercial companies controlled by those 
public bodies, which had previously had the status of IPHFs’ establishing 
entities. The Act introduces strong incentives for the transformation of 
IPHFs into commercial companies overturning at the same time their current 
status whereby they are not subject to Polish bankruptcy law. This in turn 
should contribute to enhancing their economic efficiency. Freeing the newly 
created companies from debt is, however, fundamental for the success of 
the reform because the ballast of debts incurred in the past by IPHFs would 
inevitably put into question the long-term viability of the new companies. 
Consequently, the Act introduces the possibility to waiver the overdue debt of 
existing IPHFs in the course of their transformation process into commercial 
companies.
The Act lays down a new list of legal forms for the provision of healthcare 
services in Poland renouncing the dichotomy, which has so far divided all 
healthcare providers into: Non-Public Healthcare Facilities and IPHFs4. In the 
new organizational framework, healthcare is to be undertaken by a number 
2 With the exception of certain provisions that will come into force on 1 January 2012.
3 Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Act of 15 April 2011 on Healthcare Activity, p. 1.
4 So far, in accordance with the Act of 30 August 1992 on Healthcare Facilities (Journal of 
Laws 1991 No. 91, item 408) healthcare activity could be conducted in the form of a Healthcare 
Facility – Independent Public (IPHF) and Non-Public (NPHF). IPHFs are facilities established 
by public bodies, NPHFs are entities which may be established by private law bodies including: 
companies, employers, churches, foundations and associations as well as, other national and 
foreign legal and natural persons. 
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of enumerated categories of entities including: entrepreneurs within the 
meaning of the Act on the freedom of Economic Activity5, IPHFs, budgetary 
units, research institutes and foundations. Healthcare services may also be 
provided by doctors or by nurses within the scope of their professional practice 
(individual or group). The legislator has not discarded the legal form of IPHFs. 
Nevertheless, the new Act does not provide the legal possibility of establishing 
new IPHFs and, with regard to existing ones, introduces strong incentives to 
transform them into commercial companies.
The Act specifies in detail the procedure to be followed in order to transform 
IPHFs into commercial companies. In the course of the transformation, a new 
commercial company enters into the rights and obligations of the original 
IPHF. The transformation is conducted by the governing body of the entity 
which originally established the IPHF in question (hereinafter: the establishing 
entity). The establishing entity must determine before the transformation 
process is commenced the debt ratio of the IPHF in question on the basis of 
its financial statements for the last year. This is the ratio of the total liabilities 
and short-term obligations of the given IPHP, less its short-term investments, 
to the sum of its revenues. If on the day before the transformation the ratio is 
more than 0.5, the establishing entity takes over, ex lege, the obligations of that 
IPHF up to such value as to ensure that the debt ratio for the new commercial 
company does not exceed 0.5. If the IPHF’s debt ratio is from the outset 0.5 
or lower, the new entity may acquire the obligations of the IPHF in question 
as they stand. At the same time, certain categories of obligations acquired 
by the establishing entity, which transformed the IPHF into a commercial 
company before 31 December 2013, shall be waived ex lege. This rule applies 
to certain enumerated categories of liabilities (including interest) payable to 
the State budget, known on the 31 December 2009. They include, inter alia, 
tax liabilities, social security contributions and environmental fees. Some other 
categories of public liabilities, including those resulting from local taxes, may 
be waived upon a resolution of the constituting organ of the relevant local 
government unit.
To repay other obligations taken over by the establishing entity, the latter 
may receive a grant directly from the State budget. This, however, requires the 
fulfilment of certain additional conditions including a settlement with private 
creditors. According to the Act, the total amount of 1.400.000 thousand zlotys 
(approximately 320.000 thousand EUR) has been provided in the State budget 
for such grants.
The following diagram presents the construction of the measure in question:
5 Act of 2 July 2004 (Journal of Laws 2004 No. 173, item 1807).
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At this point, the question arises whether the aforementioned measure 
can be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. It 
must be noted in this context that the measure has not been notified to the 
European Commission pursuant to the Article 108(3) TFEU. 
According to settled ECJ jurisprudence, the classification of a measure as 
State aid requires the fulfilment of the following criteria:
1. there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources,
2. the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States,
3. it must confer an advantage on the recipient; in other words – Article 
107(1) TFEU covers measures which, whatever their form, are likely to 
directly or indirectly favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded 
as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not 
have obtained under normal market conditions,
4. it must distort or threaten to distort competition6.
A preliminary assessment of the measure in question leads to the 
conclusion that it confers an economic advantage upon IPHFs which they 
would not have obtained under normal market conditions. As a result of its 
implementation, the recipients will be in whole or in part freed from debt. As 
the ECJ expressed in one of its classic cases: ‘the concept of aid is (…) wider 
than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as 
subsidies themselves, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate 
6 C-280/00 Altmark Trans, ECR [2003] I-07747, para. 75, 84.
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the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and 
which, without, therefore, being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, 
are similar in character and have the same effect’7. The size of the benefit 
granted to a particular IPHF will depend on the amount of its outstanding 
liabilities as of 31 December 2009. It will also depend on the decision of its 
establishing entity, which can determine the takeover of all or part of those 
obligations.
There is no doubt that the measure in question fulfils the first condition of 
the EU notion of State aid. The advantage conferred on IPHFs as a result of 
the reduction of their debts is financed directly from the resources of public 
authorities and/or other public bodies. Depending on the type of obligation 
in question, public funding derives from:
1. State budget – in relation to public liabilities constituting budgetary 
revenues as well as in relation to liabilities subject to government 
subsidies;
2. Local Government Units (hereafter, LGUs) – in relation to liabilities 
taken over by the establishing entities and waived pursuant to a resolution 
of the constituting organs of the LGUs;
3. Establishing entities – in relation to repayable liabilities taken over by 
them which are not subject to budgetary grants8.
Clearly therefore, the measure in question involves a transfer of State 
resources to IPHFs as they remain under the control of public authorities 
and/or other public bodies. As established in the legally binding act issued by 
the Polish parliament, the measure is as well, without any doubts, imputable 
to the State. The fulfilment by the measure in question of the remaining three 
conditions of the EU notion of State aid requires an in-depth analysis.
The Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Draft Act provides for a 
very laconic assessment of the compliance of the measure with State aid rules: 
‘the proposed solutions (…) do not breach State aid provisions. This statement 
is justified by the assumption that these entities (debt-waived independent 
public healthcare facilities and resulting from their transformation commercial 
7 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg, ECR [1961] 95, para. 3, 20; also 
T-366/00 Scott SA, ECR [2007] II-797, para. 92; C-128-129/03 AEM SpA, ECR [2005] I-2861, 
para. 38; T-274/01 Valmont Nederland, ECR [2004] II-3145, para. 44; C-276/02 Spain v. 
Commission, ECR [2004] I-8091, para. 24; C-501/00 Spain v. Commission, ECR [2004] I-6717, 
para. 90; C-328/99 and C-399/00 SIM 2 Multimedia, ECR [2003] I-4035, para. 35; C-5/01 Belgium 
v. Commission, ECR [2002] I-11991, para. 32; C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, ECR [2001] I-8365, 
para. 38; C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España, ECR [1994] I-877, para. 13; C-256/97 DM 
Transport, ECR [1999] I-3913, para. 19.
8 IPHF establishing entities are all public bodies: ministers and governing bodies of central 
authorities, voivodes, LGUs, public medical schools or public universities engaged in teaching 
and research in medical science as well as the Medical Centre of Postgraduate Education.
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companies) will provide healthcare services financed from public funds, [while 
they will provide] other services only incidentally. Therefore, there is no threat 
of distortion of competition rules.’
It is clear from the above statement that the concept adopted by the Polish 
legislator is based on two assumptions. First, that medical services financed from 
public funds are not conducted under the conditions of market competition. 
What is not clear, however, is if this statement amounts to depriving healthcare 
activity of the status of an economic activity. Second, the statement assumes 
that aid granted to an undertaking conducting simultaneously commercial 
activities and an activity not performed under the conditions of market 
competition, does not constitute State aid if the former is merely incidental 
to the latter. 
A different standpoint can be found in the Comments submitted to the draft 
Act (hereafter, Comments on the Draft Act) by the President of the Polish 
Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish: Urząd Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK). According to the UOKiK 
President, IPHFs are undertakings within the meaning of EU Competition 
Law – this conclusion arises inevitably from the ECJ judgements in Vanbraekel9 
and Smits10. The UOKiK Presidents noted that the funding provided to IPHFs 
does not, as a general rule, satisfy the requirement to distort or threaten 
to distort competition nor does it normally affect trade between Member 
States. According to the UOKiK President, this conclusion is valid insofar 
as IPHFs, within the public healthcare system, are not entitled to ‘charge 
insured persons for the provided services, if such services are vested under 
health insurance and are free.’ This observation does not apply, therefore, to 
a relatively small range of services which IPHFs provide wholly or partly for 
remuneration. Moreover, recipients of healthcare services provided by IPHFs 
within the public healthcare system are generally Polish citizens. Providing 
them to citizens of other Member States is an exception and takes place only 
in strictly defined situations (life threatening conditions or with the consent of 
a competent body of another Member State). Thus, as the UOKiK President 
pointed out, ‘the principal objective of public healthcare facilities is to meet 
the needs of Polish citizens in healthcare within healthcare services guaranteed 
by the State in a continuous and permanent way.’ Notwithstanding the above, 
and as emphasized by the UOKiK President, it cannot be excluded that the 
measure in question will affect competition. This is a consequence of the 
legal possibility of providing, by the newly created commercial companies, 
of healthcare services for remuneration to not insured patients alongside its 
publicly funded activities. Hence, in the opinion of the UOKiK President, the 
 9 C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel, ECR [2001] I-5363.
10 C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, ECR [2001] I-5363.
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measure in question should be classified as State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU and notified to the European Commission.
The opinions expressed in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Act 
and in the Comments submitted by the UOKiK President must be verified in 
the light of European jurisprudence. The starting, and indeed crucial point of 
this assessment should be on the evaluation of whether, and if so, to what an 
extent, do the healthcare activities provided by the beneficiaries of the measure 
have an economic nature. In other words, it is necessary to determine first 
whether the commercial companies created from the transformation of IPHFs 
will have the status of an ‘undertaking’. This issue is subject of an analysis 
conducted in section II below, in which two basic juridical concepts of the 
EU notion of an undertaking are confronted: the wide definition developed 
by the ECJ in Hoefner and Elser and the narrow one, related to the concept 
of the so called ‘social exclusion’. 
Section III contains the evaluation of the effect of the measure on competition. 
This analysis is preceded by a description of the types of activity normally 
conducted by IPHFs and the manner of their financing by patients and the 
Polish public sickness fund. Finally, section IV addresses the question whether 
the analysed debt write-off has an effect on trade between Member States.
II.  The nature of the activities performed by the commercial companies 
created from the transformation of IPHFs
1.  Types of activity pursued by IPHFs and companies created from their 
transformation
Both IPHFs and the companies created as a result of their transformation 
can potentially provide two types of healthcare activities: those within the 
public healthcare system and those outside of its scope. Healthcare services 
conducted within the former are provided with universal coverage. As 
a general rule, they are provided without remuneration to those insured by the 
sickness fund, organized under the principle of social solidarity, and to certain 
categories of other entitled persons. These types of services are financed from 
the resources of the National Health Fund (hereafter, NHF) – a State fund 
established specifically to manage national healthcare contributions. The NHF, 
acting pursuant to the Act on healthcare services financed from public funds11, 
contracts out the provision of healthcare services to a variety of healthcare 
11 The Act of 27 August 2004 (Journal of Laws 2004 No. 210, item 2135).
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providers, both private and public. Specific procedures for the conclusion of 
such contracts are set out in this Act and applied instead of general public 
procurement rules. The Act on healthcare services financed from public funds 
generally provides for the selection of healthcare providers in public tenders. In 
their course, the NHF is obliged to ensure equal treatment and fair competition 
between the participants of the tender. The contract is ultimately concluded 
with the candidate with the best offer, irrespective of its legal form and status.
An entity that has concluded a contract with the NHF may also provide 
medical services for remuneration, alongside those covered by that contract. 
However, charging insured patients for service covered by a contract 
concluded with the NHF is subject to a fine. This rule applies equally to all 
categories of healthcare providers. Typically therefore, in terms of hospital 
services, IPHFs conduct both types of activities: those provided to patients 
free of charge (covered by a contract with the NHF) and healthcare services 
provided for remuneration (not covered by such contract). The vast majority 
of IPHFs derive most of their revenues from their activities within the public 
healthcare system; revenue from commercial healthcare services tends to 
be of marginal importance12. This situation may, however, vary significantly 
from one IPHF to another. It is also likely that the revenue structure of the 
companies created from the transformation of IPHFs will, at least in the 
short run, remain unchanged. In the longer perspective, however, the range 
of healthcare activities provided for remuneration by the new entities should 
grow alongside the efforts placed into increasing their efficiency. 
The economic nature of healthcare activities provided by IPHFs for 
remuneration does not raise objections. This position is confirmed by numerous 
judgments of European courts, including the Pavlov case13. This concept is also 
widely commented on in literature14 even though the commentators have yet 
to reach a unified position on the nature of such activities within the overall 
public healthcare system.
12 According to the Report on the financial situation of public hospitals in Poland of 2010 
prepared by Magellan S.A. approximately 92,10% of the revenues of Polish public hospitals 
comes from NHF payments.
13 C-180/98 to 184/98 Pavlov, ECR [2000] I-6451; C-172/03 Wolfgang Heiser, ECR [2005] 
I-1627. 
14 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but Healing Patients? 
The European Market for Health Care Services after the Judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel 
and Peerbooms’ (2002) 39 C.M.L.Rev. 683-729, at 707; J. Temple Lang, ‘Privatisation of Social 
Welfare: European Union Competition Law Rules’ [in:] M. Dougan, E. Spaventa (eds.), 
Social Welfare and EU Law: Essays in European Law, Oxford 2005, 45-77 at 65; E. Szyszczak, 
Modernising Healthcare: Pilgrimage for the Holy Grail [in:] M. Krajewski, U. Neergaard, J. W. Van 
de Gronden, The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe, The 
Hague, 2009, 191-213 at 197-198.
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2. The notion of economic activity in the jurisprudence of European courts
Assessing the nature of the activities conducted by the IPHFs within the 
Polish public healthcare system must begin with quoting the classic definition 
formulated in the landmark Hoefner case15. Accordingly, ‘every entity engaged 
in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it 
is financed’16 should be seen as an undertaking. At the same time, according 
to settled ECJ case law ‘any activity consisting in offering goods and services 
on a given market is an economic activity’17. 
This ‘functional’ concept of an undertaking has been perfectly illustrated 
by the words of Advocate General F. Jacobs: ‘the Court’s general approach to 
whether a given entity is an undertaking within the meaning of the Community 
competition rules can be described as functional, in that it focuses on the type 
of activity performed rather than on the characteristics of the actors which 
perform it, the social objectives associated with it, or the regulatory or funding 
arrangements to which it is subject in a particular Member State’18.
The concept of an undertaking has not, however, been interpreted 
uniformly in the entire course of the development of European case law. As 
pointed out by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in his opinion to the FENIN 
case, European courts have generally applied two different criteria for the 
classification of an entity’s activity as an economic one – a comparative and a 
market criterion19. The comparative criterion derives directly from the concept 
of an undertaking formulated in Hoefner20. The ECJ based its conclusion 
therein on the economic nature of the activity of German public recruitment 
agencies because of the argument that such activity ‘has not always been 
and not necessarily is conducted by public entities’21. This statement became 
the grounds for a number of instances where the comparative criterion was 
adopted by the ECJ22. According to this approach, the fact that the activity 
15 C-41/90 Hoefner and Elser v Macrotron, ECR [1991] I-1979.
16 Ibidem, para. 21 and C-237/04 Enirisorse, ECR [2006] I-2843.
17 118/85 Commission v Italy, ECR [1987] 2599, para. 7; C-35/96 Commission v Italy, ECR 
[1998] I-3851, para. 36; C-180-184/98 Pavlov, ECR [2000] I-6451 and C-218/00 Cisal di Battistelo 
Venanzio, ECR [2002] I-691, para. 22, 23; C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, ECR [2001] I-9089, 
para. 19.
18 Opinion of AG Jacobs in joint cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK 
Bundesverband, ECR [2004] I-2493.
19 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in case C-205/03P FENIN, ECR [2006] II-6295, para. 
11–15.
20 C-41/90 Hoefner and Elser.
21 Ibidem, para. 22.
22 C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, para. 20; T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris, ECR [2000] II-3929, 
para.124 and T-115/04 SELEX, ECR [2006] II-4797, para. 92.
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in question is also provided by private entities (more precisely: private 
profit entities), or even the mere possibility of its provision by such entities, 
determines its economic nature23. Moreover, decisive here is not so much the 
potential profitability of that activity in a specific legal regime, but rather that 
mere possibility resulting from the nature of the activity in question24.
The market criterion, on the other hand, tends to associate the economic 
nature of an activity with the participation in a market. As pointed out by 
Poiares Maduro in this context, in recognising the economic nature of an 
activity it is not ‘the mere fact that the activity may, in theory, be carried on by 
private operators which is decisive, but the fact that the activity is carried on 
under market conditions’25. Hence, the status of an economic activity should 
be associated with an activity the results of which, in the form of goods or 
services, may be subject to a market exchange. Some authors equate this 
relation with the possibility of obtaining, in exchange for goods or services, 
remuneration that at least covers their costs26. Alternatively, they equate it 
with the profit-making potential of the service or product in question27 seeing 
as the mere possibility of making such profit presupposes the emergence 
of a market in economic terms. However, the fact that the specific entity 
operates at a profit or for profit remains irrelevant to the question of the 
nature of a given activity28. Accordingly, the existence of competition among 
market players, or even the mere possibility of its existence (disregarding any 
possible exclusive rights), is an important indicator of the economic nature of 
an activity. This view corresponds with the well known statement expressed by 
AG Jacobs that ‘the underlying question is whether that entity is in a position 
to generate the effects which the competition rules seek to prevent’29.
23 C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, para. 20; T-128/98 Aéroports de Paris, para. 124.
24 Also O. Odudu, ‘Are State-owned health-care providers undertakings subject to 
competition law?’ (2011) 5 E.C.L.R. 231–241, at 235; however differently M. Kleis, P. Nicolaides, 
‘The Concept of Undertaking in Education and Public Health Systems’ (2006) 3 EStAL 505–508, 
at 505, who link lack of classification of certain activity as economic one, with reservation of its 
exclusivity by the State; similarly J. Baquero Cruz refers to criteria of possibility of performing 
certain activity in legal reality of a certain country – J. Baquero Cruz, Service of General Interest 
and EC Law [in:] G. De Burca (ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, 
Oxford 2005, 169–212, at 179–185.
25 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in C-205/03P FENIN, para. 13.
26 M. Kleis, P. Nicolaides, The Concept…, p. 505.
27 O. Odudu, Are State-owned…, p. 235.
28 C-67/96 Albany, ECR [1999] I-5751, para. 80-87; C-244/94 FFSA, ECR [1995] I-4013, 
para. 17–22; 209–215 and 218/78 van Landewyck, ECR [1980] 3125; S. Dudzik, Pomoc państwa 
dla przedsiębiorców publicznych w prawie Wspólnoty Europejskiej. Między neutralnością a zaan-
gażowaniem, Kraków 2002, pp. 149–150.
29 Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-218/00 Cisal, ECR [2002] I-691, para. 71.
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EU jurisprudence takes a different view of undertakings operating on the 
principles of social solidarity. European courts have recognised the activities 
of so-organised health or social insurance funds as not fulfilling the criteria 
of an economic activity in a series of judgments 30. In AOK, the Court held 
that the activities of German sickness funds do not carry the characteristics 
of an economic activity because they are conducted within the public health 
insurance system, subject to the principle of social solidarity. As a result, 
they have an exclusively social nature. The ECJ took into consideration: the 
non-profit purpose of their activity and the lack of a relationship between 
the costs of the services provided to the insured and the amount of their 
insurance contributions31. Amazingly, this conclusion was not influenced 
by the significant level of discretion available to German sickness funds 
with respect to the determination of the value of healthcare contributions, 
nor by the existing, albeit small, degree of competition between the funds. 
Following the approach developed in AOK, the General Court found in 
FENIN the activity of the Spanish sickness fund to be deprived of an economic 
nature32.
Some commentators considered the aforementioned approach as 
inconsistent with the purely functional concept of an economic activity, based 
on the criterion of the existence of a market and competition33. Some authors 
took the view that EU courts have developed a sui generis sectorial exemption 
from EU competition rules with respect to undertakings whose activity is 
subject to the principle of social solidarity34. M. Krajewski and M. Farley 
went even further in their assessments by claiming that EU courts have in 
the FENIN case virtually excluded the entire public healthcare sector from 
the application of EU competition rules35.
30 C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet, ECR [1993] I-637; C-218/00 Cisal; C-264/01, C-306/01, 
C-354-355/01 AOK; T-319/99 FENIN and C-205/03P FENIN.
31 C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK; C-205/03P FENIN, para. 54.
32 T-319/99 FENIN.
33 T. Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law. Public Service and EC Law, Oxford 2005, 
p. 130; likewise: J. Baquero-Cruz, ‘Services of General Interest and EC Law’ [in:] G. de Búrca 
(ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State. In Search of Solidarity, Oxford 2005, p. 184.
34 Inter alia: M. Krajewski and M. Farley, who point to the existence of ‘social exclusion’ 
from the competition rules and - M. Krajewski, M. Farley, ‘Limited Competition in National 
Health Systems and the Application of Competition Law: The AOK Bundesverband Case’ 
(2004) 29(6) E.L. Rev. 842–851; J. L. Buendia Sierra, who uses the term ‘doctrine of the 
protected area’ – J. L. Buendia-Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies under EC Law, 
Oxford 1999, p. 52–54 and N. Boeger, who points to ‘solidarity exclusion’ – see N. Boeger, 
‘Solidarity and EC Competition Law’ (2007) 32(3) E.L. Rev. 319–340, at 319.
35 Krajewski, M., Farley, M., ‘Non-Economic Activities in Upstream and Downstream 
Markets and the Scope of Competition Law After Fenin’ (2007) 32(1) E.L. Rev. 111–124, at 123.
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European jurisprudence on internal market rules does not, however, 
confirm this view. In the Smits case, the ECJ rejected the claim of the German 
government that the ‘structural principles governing the provision of medical 
care are inherent in the organisation of the social security systems and do not 
come within the sphere of the fundamental economic freedoms guaranteed 
by the EC Treaty, since the persons concerned are unable to decide for 
themselves the content, type and extent of a service and the price they will 
pay’36. The Court confirmed that healthcare services (including those financed 
by universal health insurance) are covered by Article 56 TFEU and ‘there is 
no need for diversification in this regard between care provided in a hospital 
environment and outside it’37. The ECJ pointed out to the fact that for the 
classification of that activity as a service within the meaning of Article 56 
TFEU (thus as an economic activity), it is not relevant whether the costs of 
these services are covered directly by patients, public authorities or health 
funds38. The same approach was used in Vanbraekel39.
What is clear is that the concept of services within the meaning of Article 
56 TFEU is not equivalent to the analogous notion used on the grounds of 
EU competition rules. For Article 56 TFEU to apply, the classification of 
activities as services within the economic meaning is not sufficient, but must 
be complemented by an element of remuneration received in exchange for the 
activity in question. The latter aspect is not necessary to classify the provision 
of services as an economic activity on the grounds of competition rules40. The 
classification of a service as falling within Article 56 TFEU should, therefore, 
be all the more decisive to consider them a manifestation of an economic 
activity under competition rules. 
3. The nature of the activity of Polish public hospitals
The question arises of how to classify, in light of the aforementioned case 
law, the nature of those activities of Polish public hospitals which are financed 
by the NHF. The application of the comparative approach, as developed in 
Hoefner, would inevitably lead to the conclusion that such activities have an 
economic nature. It is apparent that under the Polish legal regime, private 
entities can provide, and indeed do provide, the same healthcare services 
as public ones. This refers both to the activity within the public healthcare 
36 C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms, para. 53.
37 Ibidem, para. 51.
38 Ibidem, para. 55.
39 C-368/98 Vanbraekel, ECR [2001] I-5363.
40 C-41/90 Hoefner and Elser, para. 21; T -155/04 SELEX.
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system and to services provided for remuneration. The comparative approach 
was applied by the ECJ in the Ambulanz Glöckner case that concerned the 
application of competition rules to ambulance transport services41. The ECJ 
held therein that both emergency transport services and patient transport 
services constitute an economic activity given that they ‘have not always been, 
and are not necessarily, carried on by such organisations (i.e. non-profit 
medical aid organizations) or by public authorities42’.
The application of the market based approach will not lead to such clear 
conclusions. Some authors expressed the opinion that EU jurisprudence 
on sickness funds should be applied per analogiam to healthcare providers. 
According to their view, services provided by public hospitals without 
remuneration should be covered by a ‘social exclusion’ from competition rules. 
P. Nicolaides and M. Kleis claimed, on the basis of an analogy to FENIN, that 
‘a public hospital that fulfils a social function (the implementation of a public 
health system belongs to an obligation which the State has towards its citizen) 
cannot be considered to be an undertaking because its operation is based 
on the principle of solidarity (…) and operates on a non-profit basis.’ They 
stipulated, however, that ‘we must be very careful not to over-generalise here 
because the case law is still evolving43’. Similarly, J. Temple Lang indicated 
that: ‘Hospitals, clinic, ambulance services and self-employed doctors are all 
(undertakings) for the purpose of the competition rules. However, public 
hospitals which provide all their services free and which are financed by the 
State are not44’.
Other authors took an opposite view. V. Hatzopoulos stressed that: ‘The 
position is less clear with regard to public hospitals, where health services 
are genuinely offered for free, being financed directly from the State budget 
and where the personnel has the status of civil servant. According to the 
broad definition of “undertaking” put forward by the Court, whereby any 
activity pursued or susceptible of being pursued for profit is to be considered 
as an economic activity, even these public hospitals should be treated as 
undertakings’. However, he pointed out that ‘this is not an unquestionable 
conclusion45’. 
E. Szyszczak reached a more straightforward conclusion: ‘the Court appears 
to assume, without much discussion, that healthcare services are economic in 
character focusing attention upon the possible justifications for the Member 
41 C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner.
42 Ibidem, para. 20.
43 M. Kleis, P. Nicolaides, The Concept…, p. 508.
44 J. Temple Lang, Privatisation of…, p. 65.
45 V. Hatzopoulos, Killing National…, p. 707.
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States to evade the full force of the Internal Market rules46’. J. W. van de 
Gronden took a similar position emphasizing the differences between the 
situation of sickness funds and healthcare providers: ‘[I]t appears from the 
analysis of this case law [i.e. case law on State welfare schemes] that the 
ECJ uses the concept of undertaking as flexible jurisdictional tool to exclude 
solidarity-based health care systems from the ambit of European competition 
law, when it comes to managing bodies. Conversely, the role of this tool 
is neglected if the competition rules are applied to health care providers’. 
Consequently ‘the ECJ almost automatically regards health care providers as 
undertakings within the meaning of European competition law47’.
Ch. Koenig and J. Paul stressed as well that ‘based on settled case law, 
health care providers do unequivocally fall under the scope of Article 107(1) 
TFEU. Therefore, public funding of hospitals is clearly subject to State aid 
law – with special privileges issued by the Courts’ decisions in Altmark Trans 
and BUPA Ireland and by the provisions of the Commission’s SGEI package48’. 
These authors have based their views on ECJ jurisprudent on the rules of the 
internal market.
According to O. Odudu: ‘Rarely will medical service providers fall outside 
the scope of the concept of undertaking’. This could take place, fundamentally, 
only with regard to contractors of such healthcare services that, by their very 
nature, are not economically viable, that is, cannot generate profits. This 
concerns in particular the so called non-excludable services, i.e. when there is 
no possibility of preventing non-payers from enjoying the benefits of a good 
or service once it is produced. As stated by the author, ‘Recognition of State-
operated and financed hospitals as undertakings is implicit in Commission 
action taken in the fields of State aids49’.
An analysis of the accumulated EU case law and doctrine leads to the 
conclusion that strong arguments exist speaking in favour of associating an 
economic nature to the activities of public hospitals, regardless of whether 
they provide healthcare services for remuneration or free of charge (wholly 
financed by sickness funds). EU jurisprudence does not confirm, however, 
the view that its approach to the classification of the nature of the activity 
of health insurance funds could be applied per analogiam to healthcare 
providers. It would be also difficult to argue against the application in the 
46 E. Szyszczak, Modernising Healthcare…, p. 197–198
47 J. W. van de Gronden, ‘Financing Health Care in EU Law: Do the European State Aid 
Rules Write Out an Effective Prescription for Integrating Competition Law with Health Care?’ 
(2009) 6(1) The Competition Law Review 5–29, at 10.
48 Ch. Koenig, J. Paul, ‘State Aid Screening of Hospital Funding Exemplified by the German 
Case’ (2010) 4 EStAL 755–770 at 761.
49 O. Odudu, Are State-owned..., p. 237.
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area of competition rules of ECJ findings expressed in free movement 
cases.
The European Commission undoubtedly considers public hospital services 
financed by sickness funds as an economic activity on the basis of ECJ 
jurisprudence on free movement rules. In its 2009 State aid decision concerning 
the Brussels IRIS network of public hospitals, the Commission regarded their 
activities as economic50. It stressed that the services provided by IRIS hospitals 
(i.e. healthcare, emergency and directly related ancillary services) ‘are also 
provided by other types of organisations or institutions, including clinics, 
private hospitals and other specialized centres, including private hospitals of 
claimants51’. It noted that such classification cannot be undermined by the 
gratuitous character of the services provided by the recipient undertakings 
nor by the social solidarity principles, on which the activity of the Belgian 
healthcare system is based. It considered that it is ‘appropriate to distinguish 
the activity within managing healthcare, pursued by public authorities in 
implementation of their prerogatives from the activity of hospital healthcare, 
which is economic in nature, even if its costs are partially or totally covered 
by the government52’. The Commission decisively stated that the measures in 
question constituted State aid. The aid was seen, however, as compatible with 
the internal market on the grounds of Article 106(2) TFEU53.
In light of the above, the activities of the Polish IPHFs and the companies 
created from their transformation, either financed by the NHF or provided 
outside the scope of its contracts, should be regarded as economic in nature. 
EU competition law, and accordingly also its State aid rules, should thus be 
considered as fully applicable to the contested measure. 
50 Decision of 28 October 2009 nr NN 54/2009 (ex- CP 244/2005) – Aide d’État Belgique 
Financement des hôpitaux publics du réseau IRIS de la Région Bruxelles-Capitale.
51 Ibidem, para. 109. 
52 Ibidem.
53 Decision 2005/842/EC of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) [EC] to 
State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest, OJ [2005] L 312/67. It should be 
noted that the scope of Decision No 2005/842/EC covers SGEI compensations granted to 
hospitals. The decision makes no distinction between private and public hospitals nor between 
activities financed by medical health insurance funds or those financed by patients. The Decision 
on IRIS hospitals confirmed that compensations for the performance of SGEI addressed both 
to public and private hospitals fall under the scope of the application of Decision No. 2005/842/
EC. This position, however, has already been expressed by the Commission in T-167/04 Asklepios 
Kliniken, ECR [2007] II-2379 at 69–74.
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III.  Waiver of debt of IPHFs and the distortion or threat of distortion 
of competition
The courts have so far been relatively reluctant to clarify the substance of 
the effect on competition condition. In the Philip Morris case54, the ECJ has 
formulated a test for the two elements of Article 107(1) – effect on trade 
between Member States and effect on competition. The Court has explicitly 
called for the application of a wide approach to both of these conditions. It held 
that effect on competition within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU should 
be distinguished from competition violations resulting from anti-competitive 
practices. Assessment of the measure in terms of Article 107(1) TFEU does 
not require a relevant market definition nor an analysis of the real impact of 
the measure on the state of market competition. In fact, any measure which 
is capable of favouring the recipient with respect to its competitors almost 
automatically distorts potential or actual competition.
The ECJ has over the years established, in essence, the presumption of the 
fulfilment of the effect on competition condition when the contested measure 
favours its beneficiary as opposed to its competitors55. The condition in question 
has thus been related to the concept of selectivity. As stated by the Court in Het 
Vlaamse Gewest, ‘Where a public authority favours an undertaking operating 
in a sector which is characterised by intense competition by granting it a benefit, 
there is a distortion of competition or a risk of such distortion’56. Therefore, as 
pointed out by L. Hancher, under the ‘classic approach’ of the ECJ ‘as long as 
the measure is granted through State intervention or through State resources 
and has the effect of conferring a selective benefit, it falls prima facie within 
the scope of Art. 87(1) EC’57. A merely grammatical interpretation of this 
provision leads to the conclusion that it refers to actual as well as potential 
54 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission, ECR [1980] 2671.
55 I. Postuła, A. Werner, Pomoc państwa, Warszawa 2006, p. 69; G. Schohe, C. Arholdt, ‘The 
Case-Law of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on State Aids in 
2002/2003’ (2003) 2 EStAL 145-168, at 150.
56 T-214/95 Het Vlaamse Gewest, ECR [1998] II-717, para. 46, see also T-217/02 Ter Lembeek, 
ECR [2006] II-4483, para. 178, the Court did not provide here a detailed analysis of the state of 
competition in the textile sector indicating only that it was characterized by intense competition 
because the market is completely open to competition; see also: B. Willemot, ‘Assessment 
of an Aid granted under the Form of a Debt Waiver. Note on case T-217/02 Ter Lembeek 
International NV v. the Commission’ (2007) 2 EStAL 370-380, at 374 as well as J.-D. Braun, 
J. Kühling, ‘Article 87 EC and the Community Courts: from Revolution to Evolution’ (2008) 
45 C.M.L. Rev. 465–498, at 482.
57 L. Hancher, ‘Towards a New Definition of a State Aid under European Law: Is there 
a New Concept of State Aid Emerging?’ (2003) 3 EStAL 365-373 at 365.
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competition58. Therefore, the assessment of possible distortions should focus 
not only on the current, but also future market situation. The competitors of 
the beneficiary of the measure, both present and likely to appear in the future, 
should thus be used as the reference point for this assessment59.
In order to evaluate the planned debt write-off, it is necessary to consider 
whether IPHFs (as well as the companies created from their transformation) 
compete with each other, or indeed with any other market players, and if not, 
whether future market entry in possible. 
Hospital services provided for remuneration are definitely provided under 
the conditions of market competition. This argument was challenged neither 
by the UOKiK President nor by the authors of the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the Draft Act. Both private and public entities active on the market for 
commercial medical services compete with each other as to their prices and 
service quality. The planned debt write-off, which would benefit only those 
healthcare providers that possess the status of an IPHF, would clearly lead 
to their preferential treatment, particularly with respect to private operators. 
This would create a serious distortion of competition in the market for 
healthcare services and affect the competitiveness of downstream and/or 
upstream markets. Contrary to the assertions contained in the Explanatory 
Memorandum, this conclusion is not negated by the fact that the revenues 
deriving from commercial activities represent a marginal share only of the 
overall revenue structure of Polish IPHFs. In fact, granting public funds to 
an IPHF that derives even only a small share of its revenue from commercial 
activities could result, in specific market situations, in a significant weakening 
of the position of its competitors.
Similarly unpersuasive seems the argument expressed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum that the public funding of IPHFs’ activities covered by NHF 
contracts had no impact on competition and the opinion expressed by the 
UOKiK President that the contested measure had, fundamentally, no such 
effect. It is indeed hard to agree with the aforementioned authorities that 
IPHFs do not compete with each other, as well as with private operators, 
within the scope of the activities covered by their contracts with the NHF. 
58 C. Baudenbacher, A Brief Guide to European State Aid Law, The Hague 1997, p. 22; 
A. Evans, European Community Law of State Aid, Oxford 1997, p. 79; I. Postuła, A. Werner, 
Pomoc publiczna, p. 69.
59 See also the opinion of AG Tizzano in joined cases C-393/04 and C-41/05 Air Liquide, 
ECR [2006] I-5293. He held therein that a measure favoring undertakings in the distribution 
and marketing of natural gas sector distorts competition despite the fact that these entities 
operated on a monopoly basis. AG pointed out at para. 53 that they are not beneficiaries 
of exclusive rights and therefore the measure ‘at least potentially, can cause distortions of 
competition in sectors where there is the normal game of competition, both on national and 
international level’. 
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It must be noted that the Polish healthcare system is based on the NHF 
contracting universal healthcare services in compliance with the principles of 
fair competition and equal treatment. In this context, IPHFs most certainly 
compete with private providers for NHF contracts and, more precisely, for 
the resulting payments. Granting significant economic benefits to those 
entities that possess the status of an IPHP only, would result in a substantial 
improvement of their competitive position as opposed to private operators 
in tenders organized by the NHF. Merely the conviction that its debts will 
be covered by public funds could persuade any given IPHF to cut its tender 
prices, even to a predatory level. This in turn would result in a distortion of 
competition in the market upstream to healthcare services60.
This very reasoning was applied by the Commission in the IRIS decision61 
where, however, a joint assessment of the selective nature of the measure 
in question and its effect on competition was performed62. The Commission 
stressed therein that the retroactive coverage of losses accumulated by public 
hospitals will bring an effect of mitigating the charges which are normally 
included in the budget of an undertaking. Thus, such measures are selective 
and, as a general rule, distort competition63.
To sum up, the Polish measure under consideration here should undoubtedly 
be classified as fulfilling the condition of distorting or threatening to distort 
competition. It is irrelevant which of the two types of healthcare activity 
typically pursued by IPHFs would the measure concern. In other words, the 
condition in question would be satisfied even by the waiver of debt of an IPHF 
that only provides healthcare activities financed by the NHF.
Considered surprising must therefore be the position expressed by 
the UOKiK President in the Comments on the Draft Act that the public 
financing supporting the activities of the IPHFs conducted within the public 
healthcare system does not, in general, affect competition. This view seems 
to be based on an approach to the condition in question which is inconsistent 
with ECJ jurisprudence. As previously shown, the possibility of conducting 
a specific activity under the conditions of competition implies its economic 
nature. Amazingly, the concept used by the UOKiK President presupposes an 
60 As the Commission held in its Green Paper on SGEI of 21 May 2003, COM(2003)270 
final at p. 44: ‘Furthermore, while there may be no market for the provision of particular 
services to the public, there may nevertheless be an upstream market where undertakings 
contract with the public authorities to provide these services. The internal market, competition 
and state aid rules apply to such upstream markets’.
61 Decision of 28 October 2009 nr NN 54/2009 (ex- CP 244/2005) – Aide d’État Belgique 
Financement des hôpitaux publics du réseau IRIS de la Région Bruxelles-Capitale.
62 Ibidem, para. 122–126.
63 Ibidem, para. 125.
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economic nature of the activities of IPHFs but considers, at the same time, 
that they are not performed under the conditions of market competition.
The views expressed in this context by the UOKiK President are the more 
surprising that the Polish competition authority has repeatedly found the 
Polish NHF to have abused its dominant position64 in the relevant market 
defined as a national or local market for the organisation of healthcare 
services financed from public funds. In these decisions, the UOKiK President 
presented an in-depth analysis of the distortions of competition arising in the 
so-defined relevant markets. Moreover, in decisions on practices concerning 
the setting of tender criteria that favour current healthcare providers, the 
UOKiK President pointed out that such practices caused serious distortions 
of competition between tender participants65. It is hard to understand why 
did the UOKiK President, while applying Polish antitrust law, recognise the 
distortion of competition resulting from the NHF favouring certain healthcare 
providers over others, while it did not, in general, see such effects on the 
grounds of State aid rules where the planned debt write-off would give 
preferential treatment to another group of services providers.
IV.  Waiver of debt of the IPHF and effect on trade between 
Member States
The condition of the effect on trade between Member States is consistently 
being interpreted widely by EU courts. In Philip Morris, the ECJ held that it is 
satisfied ‘when the state financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking 
compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade66’. 
Crucial in this context is the existence of intra-European trade in goods or 
services offered by the recipient undertaking. In subsequent judgments, the 
courts emphasized that ‘the relatively small amount of aid or the relatively 
small size of the undertaking which receives it does not as such exclude the 
possibility that intra-Community trade might be affected67’. In Hytasa, the 
64 Decisions: of 10 July 2009, RWA-9/2009; of 7 March 2007, DOK-28/07; of 31 August 2006, 
RGD-20/2006; of 11 May 2006, RPZ-12/2006; of 31 May 2005, RPZ-14/2005; of 1 October 
2004, RGD-18/2004; of 10 September 2004, RGD-13/2004; of 8 August 2003, RGD-13/2003; 
of 23 June 2003, RBG-6/2003.
65 Decisions: of 10 July 2009, RWA-9/2009; of 31 August 2006, RGD-20/2006; of 23 June 
2003, RBG-6/2003.
66 730/79 Philip Morris, para. 11.
67 C-142/87 Tubemeuse, ECR [1990] I-959, para. 43 and C-278-280/92 Hytasa, ECR [1994] 
I-4103, para. 42; T-214/95 Het Vlaamse Gewest, ECR [1998] II-717, para. 48; C-280/00 Altmark 
Trans, para. 81–82; C-172/03 Heiser, ECR [2005] I-1627, para. 32–33.
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Court concluded that ‘where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, 
domestic production may for that reason be maintained or increased with the 
result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance 
of exporting their products to the market in that Member State68’.
In Altmark, the ECJ pointed out that the condition in question ‘does 
not (…) depend on the local or regional character of the transport services 
supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned69’. A given measure 
may constitute State aid even if it is granted to an undertaking which provides 
only local or regional services. The granting of a public subsidy to such an 
undertaking may, nevertheless, maintain or increase its service supply capacity 
to the detriment of undertakings established in other Member States. Such 
measure could therefore diminish their chances to provide services in the 
market of the Member State where the aid was granted70. The ECJ concluded 
that ‘according to ECJ case law there is no threshold or percentage below which 
it may be considered that trade between Member States is not affected71’.
In Heiser, the ECJ upheld a Commission decision establishing that the aid 
granted to Austrian dentists may affect trade between Member States. The 
Court held therein that the effect on EU trade condition was met, given that 
local dentists might be in competition with their colleagues established in 
another Member State72.
A different approach was, nevertheless, applied by the Commission in 
numerous cases on certain types of services of a purely local nature. In the 
famous decision concerning aid to a swimming pool located in the German 
city of Dorsten73, the Commission focused not on the possibility of new market 
entry, but on the territorial radius of potential customers of the beneficiary. 
The Commission considered therein that public funding granted to the 
scrutinised pool did not affect trade between Member States because only 
local residents were to be its users (residents of Dorsten and the surrounding 
area within 50km from the city). Thus, territorial impact of the measure did 
not go beyond German borders.
68 C-278-280/92 Hytasa, para. 40; 102/87 France v Commission, ECR [1988] 4067, para. 
19; this approach has been confirmed in Maribel, in which the Court indicated that it is not 
necessary for the beneficiary to provide export activity to fulfill the condition of effect on trade; 
see: C-75/97 Maribel, ECR [1999] I-3671, para. 47.
69 C-280/00 Altmark Trans, para. 82.
70 Ibidem, para. 77, 78.
71 Ibidem, para. 81.
72 Ibidem, para. 35.
73 Decision N 258/00 – Deutschland Freizeitbad Dorsten.
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The same approach was applied in subsequent decisions on recreational 
facilities74, museums75 and cultural activity76. It has, however, never been 
applied to healthcare services. On the contrary, in the aforementioned Belgian 
hospitals decision, the Commission concluded that trade between Member 
States could indeed be affected by the aid given to the IRIS network77. It 
stressed that the activity of public hospitals is subject to intra-Community trade 
as their public funding could result in the maintenance or improvement of 
their market position. It could, therefore, restrict the opportunities to develop 
a competing activity by operators from other Member States. Admittedly, 
the Commission noted that the limited extent of trans-border mobility of 
European patients, and the resulting small number of patients from other 
Member States using the services of the IRIS hospital network, meant that the 
impact of the measure in question on EU trade was very limited. Its existence 
could not, however, be ruled out78.
Similarly, J. W. van de Gronden pointed out that due to the arrangements 
for cross-border provision of healthcare services made on the basis of ECJ 
jurisprudence on free movement rules, ‘it is risky to assume that the trade 
between Member States is not influenced79’. The author recognised at the same 
time the key role which the recently adopted Directive on patient mobility will 
have in opening national healthcare services markets to competition in the 
European dimension80.
The analysis of the effect of the Polish measure on trade between Member 
States does not lead to straightforward conclusions. With respect to some 
public hospitals, in particular the very small ones and those in remote locations, 
the impact on EU trade of their debt write-off will be definitely small. Indeed, 
it cannot be excluded that EU trade will not be affected at all in some cases. 
It is difficult to expect that patients from other Member States would choose 
to use the services of small or remote Polish hospitals to the detriment of their 
own healthcare providers. Language and cultural barriers remain an effective 
obstacle to the use of healthcare services in other Member States.
However, such obstacles do not affect the activities of highly specialised 
hospitals including clinical ones and those located in metropolitan areas with 
74 Decision in case – Funds for non-profit marinas in Holand, OJ [2004] L 34/63.
75 Decisions NN 136/A/2003, France. Funds for Ecomusée d’Alsace, OJ [2007] C 96; 
N 377/2007, Holland. Support for Bataviawerf, OJ [2008] C 35.
76 Decision N 448/2005 – Spain, aid for theatric, music and dance productions.
77 Decision NN 54/2009 (ex- CP 244/2005) – Aide d’État Belgique Financement des hôpitaux 
publics du réseau IRIS de la Région Bruxelles-Capitale.
78 Ibidem, at 129–130.
79 J. W. van de Gronden, Financing Health…, p. 21.
80 Ibidem. Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 
2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, OJ [2011] L 88/45.
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well developed transport inter-connections. In their case, medical tourism 
definitely exists. The same refers to hospitals located near national borders. 
In their case, State aid would definitely result in a distortion of trade between 
neighbouring Member States.
The assessment of the effect on EU trade condition made from the supply 
side point of view leads to slightly different conclusions. There is no legal 
barrier to enter the Polish healthcare services market, hospitals included. 
Due to the relatively small funds allocated to healthcare, there are currently 
no strong incentives to enter the market for services financed by the NHF. 
However, even such development cannot be excluded, in particular, in relation 
to the so-called high-point medical procedures, that is to say, those for which 
the NHF is willing to pay relatively high rates. In this context, the measure 
in question could distort trade between Member States by weakening the 
incentives of potential foreign competitors to enter the Polish market for 
healthcare services.
 It can still be argued that, as the UOKiK President pointed out, financing 
granted to some of the Polish public hospitals would not affect trade between 
Member States due to the completely localized nature of their activity. 
This argument loses its importance, however, as the measure in question is 
potentially directed to all IPHFs (specified in a general and abstract manner). 
Thus, the Act must be classified as establishing an aid scheme within the 
meaning of Article 1(d) of the procedural regulation81. Even if the localised 
effects argument remains valid for certain kinds of hospitals (small and/
or rural ones), the measure in question does not differentiate between the 
different types of its beneficiaries. Thus, its implementation would inevitably 
cause an effect on EU trade with respect to a significant part of Polish public 
hospitals.
V. Conclusions
The above analysis leads to the clear conclusion that the measure in question 
should be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
It satisfies all the conditions of the EU notion of State aid and is thus subject 
to the notification obligation to the European Commission under Article 
108(3) TFEU. Due to the failure to notify the contested measure, the debt 
write-off in question should be classified as unlawful aid within the meaning 
of Article 1(f) of the procedural regulation. Under the Commission’s current 
81 Council Regulation No. 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93  of the EC Treaty, OJ [1999] L 83/1.
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enforcement practice, state financing granted to public hospitals is, generally, 
considered as State aid, as illustrated by the Belgian decision.
The views expressed in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Act 
find support neither in ECJ jurisprudence nor in the opinions of the doctrine. 
Moreover, in agreement with the prevailing views of the commentators and 
as confirmed by EU jurisprudence, providers of healthcare services, unlike 
public sickness funds, are not subject to a ‘social exclusion’. This refers to the 
situation of Polish healthcare services operators as well. Clearly, they must be 
considered as being subject to the functional definition of an undertaking as 
developed in the Hoefner and Elser judgments. It follows from the above that 
Mr. Hoefner’s and Mr. Elser’s visit to Poland would definitely undermine the 
fundaments of the recent Polish healthcare reform.
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